In this paper, we analyze coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within the EMU by focusing, in a dynamic set-up, on asymmetries, externalities, and the existence of a multi-country context. We study how coalitions among fiscal and monetary authorities are formed and what are their effects on the stabilization of output and price. In particular, our attention is directed to study the consequences on these issues of different institutional contexts in which policy-makers may act. Among other results, we found that, in the presence of externalities, the occurrence of asymmetries is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cooperation.
Introduction
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is a highly integrated economic area with a large number of interactions between the participating countries. Given the presence of externalities, the design of macroeconomic stabilization policies is a crucial issue. In the literature on macroeconomic policy analysis, the issue of coordination of stabilization policies has been an important aspect. 1 The coordination of macroeconomic policies concerns (i) the issue of coordination of monetary and …scal policies and (ii) the coordination of stabilization policies among di¤erent countries. Most studies use static models, in which generally only two (often symmetric) countries act. In the EMU case, most of these studies argue that the introduction of the EMU, which implies a common monetary policy and restrictions on …scal policy at the national level, increases the need for macroeconomic policy cooperation due to the various interactions and externalities from national macroeconomic policies. However, given the potentially adverse reaction by the European Central Bank (ECB), as a result of free-riding and/or a con ‡ict on the orientation of the policy mix, …scal coordination might likely be counterproductive. The introduction of a third player may have dramatic e¤ects on the standard propositions based on a two-country model. 2 For example, Rogo¤ (1985) and Kehoe (1988) suggest that, in this case, cooperation may be counterproductive since the introduction of a third player may turn the prisoners' dilemma in a deadlock game.
3 Di¤erent types of games are mutually compared by Carraro (1997) .
Although the usefulness of studying macroeconomic stabilization in a dynamic context is well known in the literature 4 , almost all studies related to a common monetary area use a static model to derive policy recommendations. This paper analyzes the design of macroeconomic stabilization policies and their coordination in EMU using an explicit dynamic structure in which all aspects of policy coordination have an explicit time and timing dimension. In particular, policy strategies, the externalities and the payo¤s obtained by a coalition of the policy-makers who coordinate their policies depend crucially on the other policy-makers' behavior over time in this dynamic approach.
Coordination of (national) …scal policies and (a common) monetary policy will be investigated by focusing on the role played by: i) asymmetries (in structural and preference parameters), ii) externalities, which are the key to endogenously explain the coalition formation, and iii) the existence of a multi-country context, all in a dynamic set-up. The paper addresses the question how coalitions among …scal and monetary authorities are formed within the EMU and what are their e¤ects on the stabilization of output and prices. In particular, our attention is directed to study the consequences on these issues of di¤erent institutional contexts in which policy-makers may act.
The e¤ects of policy coordination will be studied by using the concepts of strategic bargaining applied to dynamic non-cooperative game theoretic models introduced in the EMU context by van Aarle et al. (2001a,b) . 5 The formation and consequences of coalitions of policy-makers is one of our main interests and will be investigated by using the recent endogenous coalition formation theory. This recent literature on endogenous coalition studies non-cooperative games where the players can play alone (as a 'singleton') or share their preferences with other players (coalitions). Therefore, this approach is particularly suited to study the interactions among players in environments where externalities occur. 6 This paper extends the dynamic two-country EMU model of Engwerda et al. (2002) in two ways. First, we explicitly introduce the issue of endogenous coalitions. Second, the analysis of macroeconomic stabilization policies is extended to a three-country monetary union. More in detail, we use the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. According to Yi (1997) , this approach consists in reducing a game in normal form to a two-stage game (a partitioned game). In the …rst stage policy-makers try to form coalitions among them by playing non-cooperatively according to di¤erent possible initial assumptions (to which di¤erent equilibrium concepts correspond). Afterwards, in the second stage of the game, the coalitions formed (or the singletons) play non-cooperatively in setting their stabilization policies to face an asymmetric shock in a dynamic environment as that described in Engwerda et al. (1999) and (2002) .
The model is solved by numerical simulations, which are performed by using "ad hoc" parameter values. This procedure is rather usual in the literature; see e.g. Turnovsky et al. (1988 ), Hughes Hallett (1987 , Neck and Dockner (1995) , and Hughes Hallett and Ma (1996) . A notable exception is Carraro (1997) , who combines model estimation, preference revelation and game simulation in a single experiment by assuming no shift of regime during the period which is considered by him. However, in our case several additional problems prevent econometric estimation, e.g. assumptions about regime shifts are extremely di¢cult to be formulated, too few data are available, 7 and, also related to this, it is virtually impossible to determine a long-run equilibrium, which is necessary to de…ne the variables of our model. 5 Early research (e.g. Plasmans and de Zeeuw (1980) ) has focused on axiomatic bargaining behavior of a similar issue in a non-cooperative setting.
6 Examples of such applications are common in the literature on environmental economics (see, e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco (1992) and Carraro (1998) ). But, recently, endogenous coalition formation theory has also been applied to contexts which are more similar to that of our paper, e.g., on the formation of trade blocks by Baldwin (1995) and on the formation of a monetary union by Kohler (2002) . 7 The EMU exists only since January 1999.
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In our numerical simulations we will consider a model of the EMU based on three countries where the national governments and the ECB have di¤erent priorities. The governments are mainly concerned with output stabilization whereas the ECB's primary target (according to art. 105 of its mandate) is price stabilization in the Euro-area. In addition, we introduce de…cit stabilization as an explicit objective of the individual governments. By doing this we include the …scal stringency requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact as an element in the decision making problem of the …scal authorities. Interest rate smoothing is included in the ECB objectives. In the EMU context it is interesting to analyze how such externally imposed institutional restrictions on policy instruments a¤ect the design of optimal policies and aspects of policy cooperation.
In our model di¤erent forms of asymmetry may be investigated: countries may have asymmetric structural model parameters (model asymmetry), policymakers may have di¤erent preferences (preference asymmetry), policy-makers may have di¤erent bargaining powers (power asymmetry), and, …nally, shocks may asymmetrically hit countries (shock asymmetry).
In this paper we restrict our attention to three realistic scenarios where several policy regimes (coalitions among policy-makers) are analyzed: a) A benchmark three-country monetary union with model and power symmetry. In this case, apart from the shocks, the only form of asymmetry is the di¤erent priority placed on output and price stabilization by the governments and the ECB, respectively. b) A three-country monetary union with model symmetry but power asymmetry, where at least one …scal authority participating in a …scal coalition has a lower bargaining power than one of the other participants.
c) A three-country monetary union with model asymmetry (measured by di¤erent degrees of openness and competitiveness), characterized by the ECB, two symmetric countries that are more open and more exposed to competitiveness than a third country.
Regarding the preference asymmetry, we always assume that the …scal authorities have the same preferences (mainly concerning output stabilization), but these preferences will be di¤erent from those of the ECB (mainly concerning price stabilization).
8 Shock asymmetry will always be present as we will explain later.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a stylized model of macroeconomic stabilization in the EMU. Section 3 analyses coalition formation (coalitions as policy regimes) in the context of macroeconomic stabilization policies in the EMU. To do so, concepts of endogenous coalition formation are introduced. Section 4 develops simulations of numerical examples to provide further insights in the basic mechanisms and intuitions. Section 5 concludes by summarizing the main …ndings of our analysis. In the Appendix mathematical derivations are gathered.
redistribution that high de…cits imply and, in that interpretation, 6 " could also re ‡ect the priority attached to …scal retrenchment and consolidation.
As stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB directs the common monetary policy at stabilizing prices and, as long as not in contradiction to price stabilization, stabilizing output in the aggregate EMU economy. An important question concerns the (mix of) monetary policy instruments operated by the ECB. In particular the discussions have centered around the distinction between an interest rate targeting strategy and a monetary targeting strategy.
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In the …rst case the short-term interest rate is the main policy instrument, in the second case some monetary aggregate is targeted by the ECB. While both strategies will in principle have broadly the same e¤ects, their exact transmissions are somewhat di¤erent.
12 Since interest rate targeting policies and interest smoothing objectives are currently receiving much attention in monetary policy analysis (see e.g. Taylor (1999) and Sack (2000)), we choose the EMU-wide nominal interest rate as the ECB's monetary policy instrument and add an interest rate smoothing objective in ECB's cost function e.g. to express the ECB's caution in setting the monetary policy. Consequently, we assume that the ECB is confronted with the following optimization problem:
where _ * ! := P 3 "=1 4 !" _ * " and ! ! := P 3 "=1 5 !" ! " ; 4 !" and 5 !" indicate the relative weights of country ,'s in ‡ation and output in the average in ‡ation and output considered by the ECB.
The policy-makers' loss function can be rewritten as:
where :
= 1, and ; " are coe¢cient matrices de…ned in the Appendix. 11 In ‡ation (forecast) targeting has also been proposed as a third alternative monetary policy strategy. According to this strategy a central bank compares the in ‡ation forecast for some periods ahead (e.g. two years), which is conditional on the actual short-term interest rate, with its in ‡ation target. If the forecast exceeds the target, the short-term interest rate must be raised and vice versa. However, in ‡ation (forecast) targeting does not imply a fully transparent monetary policy since in ‡ation forecasts are provided by the central bank. Hence, the in ‡ation (forecast) targeting is not further explored in this paper. In static models this monetary strategy has, however, been discussed in more detail for the EMU (see e.g. Svensson (1999) ). 12 In the monetary targeting case, the common money supply is exogenous and it is assumed to be the (sole) policy instrument of the ECB. The common interest rate then clears the common money market. In the interest rate targeting case, the common nominal interest rate is assumed to be the (sole) policy instrument of the ECB and the common money market is cleared by adjustments in the money supply. In Engwerda et al. (1999) the ECB implements a monetary targeting strategy, whereas in van Aarle et al. (2001 a,b) the ECB adopts an interest rate targeting strategy.
Henceforth, for reasons of convenience, we assume that " 0 = 0 and 9 is equal to zero. The issue of coalition formation is analyzed by using the partitioned game approach, which reduces a game in normal form to a two-stage game (a partitioned game). In the …rst stage policy-makers try to form coalitions among them by playing non-cooperatively. In the second stage of the game, the coalitions formed (or the singletons) play non-cooperatively in setting their stabilization policies to face an asymmetric shock. Unfortunately, game theory is far from having achieved a well-de…ned noncooperative theory of coalition formation. Therefore, there are several stability concepts that can be used and that provide di¤erent equilibrium coalition structures. Di¤erent possible ways to model the endogenous coalition formation could be helpful in deriving some indications about the optimal institutional design of the EMU area. In fact, according to Ecchia and Mariotti (1997) , di¤er-ent equilibrium concepts can be seen as di¤erent institutional contexts where policy-makers act. Such a kind of investigation might be particularly interesting in the current European debate where the " …nal asset" of the EMU is still under discussion. More in detail, the possible candidate equilibrium concepts for the …rst stage of the game can be grouped in three main categories.
1. The standard Nash equilibrium concept introduced in the coalition literature by the seminal studies of d 'Aspremont et al. (1983) in the industrial organization literature and its several variants as surveyed in Carraro (1998).
2. The equilibrium concepts related to a sequential entry approach (Sequential Negotiation Equilibrium). 14 With such an approach, one player after the other decides to propose a coalition to the other players. These decisions are determined by non-cooperative best-reply rules, given the coalition structure and the allocation in the previous rounds. One of the nice features of this approach is that it might explain in terms of history why speci…c stable coalitions are reached among the many possible ones. In other words, the importance of historical relationships between nations might be captured by this approach. 13 Assuming " di¤erent from zero, the model could easily be solved following the procedure used in this paper after a simple transformation of variables, i.e. transforming #($) into % "' where ' 2 IR 3£3 is a diagonal matrix with ones on the main diagonal (see Engwerda et al. (1999) , p.263, for further details).
14 See, e.g., Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) . 3. The solution concepts based on the idea of indirect domination, which implies farsightedness (Farsighted Coalitional Equilibrium; see, e.g., Chwe (1994) , and Mariotti (1998) ). The indirect domination concept captures the idea that each agent (or coalition of agents), who deviates from a given coalition structure, has anticipated further deviations of other agents.
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In this paper we focus on the …rst kind of solution concepts for reasons of brevity and to keep the model simple. However, some intuitions based on an informal discussion of the e¤ects of the other two strands of solution concepts will also be presented.
The second stage of the game (when coalitions have already been formed) is solved by using the open-loop Nash equilibrium concept as presented in the previous section.
16 . To formalize possible types of coordination behavior among policy-makers, we have to introduce some additional notation. We call a coalition any nonempty subset of the policy-makers' set (i.e. the set formed by all policy-makers f1-2-3-<g). Moreover, we assume that policy-makers in a coalition cooperatively set their instruments in order to minimize a common loss function, i.e. a convex combination of their respective loss functions. A coalition structure is a partition of the policy-makers' set into coalitions. Therefore, each coalition structure is associated with a policy regime, i.e. which policy-makers are cooperating and which are not.
Indicating by > " a generic element (coalition) of the coalition structure (policy regime), we can formally represent the policy coordination game for each given policy regime as obtaining the (open-loop) Nash equilibrium of the di¤erential game de…ned by the system (4) of di¤erential equations and by the loss function(s):
15 More in detail, according to Ecchia and Mariotti (1998) , a multi-stage negotiation procedure that implies farsightedness can be described informally in the following way. At each stage, a coalition structure (strategy pro…le) is the current status quo. Then, one policymakers' coalition may be formed and di¤erent sets of strategies may be proposed so that another status quo can be reached. If somebody else (either a policy-makers' coalition or a single policy-maker) deviates from the status quo, all members of that coalition are free to propose to deviate further. The deviating coalition may be the same initial coalition. This means that there is no permanent commitment: agreements between member policy-makers are no longer binding when the status quo changes. The policy-makers are only interested in the loss associated with a permanent status quo. So, the process continues in this way until there is a status quo from which nobody wishes to deviate. At this point coalitions are de…ned. Hence, the farsightedness characteristic replaces the Nash myopic behavior by a longer-term horizon. 16 We assume that there does not exist a transfer mechanism which compensates those agents who may loose by joining (leaving) the coalition (e.g. side-payments). However, the existence of a transfer mechanism does not seem to be compatible with the EMU context. This does not mean that transfer mechanisms cannot be analyzed (see e.g. Casella (1999) and ). These are not considered here, also for reasons of conciseness.
where 3 " (") is the loss function of the coalition > " and ? & is the policy-maker ='s bargaining weight in the coalition > " . 17 The number of coalitions acting in each regime is clearly equal to the cardinality of , for example if is equal to f(1-2-3)-<g, the number of coalitions is equal to 2 and 3 1 (") is the loss associated with the (full) …scal coalition while 3 2 (") is that associated with the ECB.
The minimization of the loss function(s) (8) subject to the system (4) of di¤erential equations yields the following optimal controls: 0
where
with the initial disequilibrium ((0) =: ( 0 2 IR 3 , and the matrix ª () is computed via the eigenstructure of a matrix that is determined by the coalition structure (see Appendix).
Note that according to (9) the optimal strategies are a linear feedback rule on the state variables and are moreover depending on the coalition structure in place. The resulting (optimal) losses that policy-makers incur equal:
for , 2 f1-2-3-<g.
Using the policy-makers' optimal costs (10), we will consider the following policy regimes:
(a) The non-cooperative solution f1-2-3-<g, where no policy coordination occurs.
(b) The grand coalition f(1-2-3-<)g, where all policies are set in a cooperative manner.
(c) The full …scal coalition f(1-2-3)-<g and the partial …scal coalitions: f(1-2)-3-<g, f(1-3)-2-<g and f1-(2-3)-<g, where some (or all governments) agree to coordinate the setting of their …scal policy.
Partial coalitions involving the ECB and one or two countries are not considered for the following reasons. First, the ECB is a common institution. Therefore, partial coalitions between the ECB and only some countries in the Euro area are, in principle, di¢cult to justify. Second, previous studies (see van Aarle et al. (2001a,b) ) show that, in general, these coalitions are in most cases unlikely to arise since they imply losses for the coalition members being higher than those associated with the non-cooperative solution. Third, considering also the coalition involving the ECB notably increases the number of possible coalitions with another twelve policy regimes a¤ecting the compact exposition of the results.
As said above, we mainly restrict our attention to the …rst mechanism of coalition formation: the coalitional Nash equilibrium (CNE), although other solution concepts (sequential and farsightedness equilibria) will also brie ‡y be discussed. A CNE is an equilibrium of a one-shot game where agents simultaneously face the problem of accepting or rejecting a proposal that consists in sharing their loss function and cooperatively setting their instruments. After that all agents' decisions are taken, the CNE is formed. More formally the CNE is characterized by two properties:
1. Pro…tability property. The losses in the coalition must be lower than or equal to the non-cooperative losses for all coalition members.
2. Stability property: (a) internal stability: the loss of each coalition member must be lower than or equal to the loss that the same policy-maker faces when she defects from the coalition and the other members do not change their strategies; (b) external stability: the losses of each non-coalition member must be lower than the losses that the policy-maker faces when she joins the coalition. 18 A coalition (structure) is said to be stable if it is both internally and externally stable.
Pro…tability assures that the coalition is convenient for its members, while stability guarantees that the equilibrium is self-enforcing. A CNE is based on the following assumption: when leaving (joining) a coalition, each agent assumes that the other agents are not changing their strategies. In other words, this assumption is equivalent to the assumption of the Nash conjectures in a simultaneous oligopoly game where a player assumes no change in the other players' decision variable(s) when she modi…es her own decision variable(s).
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Under the assumption that non-members can join an existing coalition without the permission of the existing members (open membership assumption), pro…tability and stability completely characterize a CNE equilibrium.
Coalition theory often uses other assumptions as exclusive membership and coalition unanimity (Bloch (1997) ). Exclusive membership means that potential coalition members cannot enter the coalition without the permission of the coalition members. In this case, an equilibrium is characterized by the pro…tability and the internal stability properties. Assuming coalition unanimity means that the whole coalition is assumed to collapse when one of its members defects. Hence, an equilibrium under unanimity is fully characterized by pro…tability only. Notice that in the EMU context most economic policy measures should be decided by all the members through a quali…ed or unanimous majority.
Numerical simulations 4.1 The scenarios
We investigate three possible realistic scenarios where all policy regimes de…ned in the previous section are considered.
I In the …rst scenario we assume a monetary union with model and power symmetry (symmetric countries). This scenario basically represents the extension to a three-country case of the two-country model considered by van Aarle et al. (2001a,b) in a similar game.
II In the second scenario we assume a monetary union with model symmetry but power asymmetry (e.g. large vs. small countries). More in particular, one …scal authority (small country) has a lower bargaining power than the other two …scal authorities (large countries).
III Finally, we consider the case of a monetary union with model asymmetry (di¤erent degrees of openness and competitiveness), which is characterized by two symmetric countries that are more open and more exposed to competitiveness than a third country.
In all the numerical simulations we assume that the governments' priority is real output stabilization while the ECB, which equally weighs all countries, is mainly concerned about price stabilization. In particular, the …scal policymakers are assumed to have the same preferences but, in general, policy-makers will have di¤erent preferences (preference asymmetry). More in detail, the policy-makers' preferences are assumed to be described by the following values: 4 = 0@2, 4 ! = 0@8, 5 = 0@4, 5 ! = 0@3, 6 = 0@15, and 9 = 0@15. Moreover, the initial state of the EMU area is assumed to be equal to (
This initial state corresponds to the case of an asymmetric price shock in the EMU (shock asymmetry) where, initially, prices in country 2 are 5% higher than in the two other countries. This implies that the low-price countries 1 and 3 initially face favorable terms of trade with respect to the high-price country 2, and therefore, real output deviations will be positive in the low-price countries and negative in the high-price one. The other parameters used in the numerical simulations, as well as the results of our experiments, are described in detail in the following subsections.
Notice that, considering the shock asymmetry, the …rst benchmark scenario shows two full symmetric countries (countries 1 and 3) whereas scenarios II and III involve that all countries are asymmetric. In fact, in the second scenario countries 1 and 3 di¤er from country 2 according to the initial price shock, but country 1 di¤ers from country 3 with respect to the bargaining power (power asymmetry). In the third scenario, countries 1 and 3 again di¤er from country 2 because of (at least) the initial price shock, but country 1 di¤ers from country 3 with respect to the structural parameters (model asymmetry). Hence, our three-country approach really extends the two-country model of the kind as in Engwerda et al. (2002) .
Scenario I -Symmetric countries (model symmetry)
In the …rst scenario, the structural (form) parameters are assumed to be the same for all the countries (model symmetry) with the following values: the aggregate demand elasticity # with respect to the real …scal de…cit is assumed to be equal to 1, the output semi-elasticity % of the real interest rate is assumed to be 0.4, the output elasticity ' of competitiveness is assumed to be 0.2, the output elasticity ) of foreign output (degree of openness) is assumed to be 0.4, and the Phillips curve coe¢cient +, which measures the extent of nominal rigidities, is assumed to be 0.25. All the policy-makers are assumed to have the same bargaining power when they cooperate (power symmetry). In this scenario, the sole form of asymmetry is related to the price shock (shock asymmetry) which makes the (high-price) country 2 di¤erent from the other two symmetric (low-price) countries. Table 1 presents the results of our …rst numerical simulation. These results widely re ‡ect the model and power symmetries assumed. As in a two-country model (see e.g. van Aarle et al. (2001b) ), where these kinds of symmetries are considered, there is no di¤erence between the grand coalition B and the full …scal coalition C . This occurs because of two characteristics of this scenario related to the symmetry assumptions. First, as shown in …gures 1 and 2 below, the …scal policies of the low-price (high-output) countries are exactly o¤set by the …scal policy of the other country, due to the model symmetry and the preference symmetry among …scal authorities. Second, due to the model symmetry, the ECB does not a¤ect the dynamics of the competitiveness since changes in the common nominal interest rate equally a¤ect all the prices. Results dramatically change when partial …scal coalitions are formed, even in this symmetric setting. With partial …scal coalitions all the players, including the ECB, are directly a¤ected in their optimal policies and losses. However, since countries 1 and 3 (low-price countries) face the same shock their optimal losses are the same (or symmetric in the partial coalitions with the country which su¤ers from high prices).
[around here table 1] In all the regimes, the higher-price country su¤ers from higher optimal costs since it faces a positive price shock (increase in price) while the other two countries face a negative price shock. Consequently, the ECB will mainly pursue an restrictive monetary policy in order to stabilize the output (prices) in the low-price countries.
Pro…table regimes are the …scal regime C (and the grand coalition B) and the partial coalitions between the high-price country and one of the other two ((1-2) and (2-3)), while the coalition between the low-price countries (1-3) is not pro…table. This result seems to con…rm that …scal coordination is counterproductive unless asymmetries are present. In fact, in the case of cooperation between two symmetric countries that face the same kind of price shock (fully symmetric countries), cooperation increases the countries' optimal losses. This result, which is often observed for the two-country models, is due to the central bank's action, which o¤sets that of the …scal players. 20 Cooperation between countries that face asymmetric shocks (i.e. all the coalitions where the highprice country is included) is pro…table. Related to this observation, in a threecountry context, cooperation between symmetric countries becomes pro…table if they also cooperate with a third asymmetric country.
Regarding the stability property, all the pro…table coalitions are internally stable but only the full …scal coalition (and the grand coalition) is also externally stable. Therefore, the full …scal and the grand coalitions are the CNE of the game. This result derives from the following two characteristics of the numerical simulation. First, the ECB cannot neutralize the cooperation among …scal players (if they are not all fully symmetric). Second, free-riding behavior is not optimal for the …scal players since, when they leave the full …scal coalition, they su¤er higher (optimal) costs.
Considering di¤erent games of endogenous coalition formation (e.g. sequential entry or farsightedness), it is easy to argue that the …nal equilibrium will always be the full …scal coalition (or the grand coalition) since it is the …rst best for all the policy-makers.
[around here …gure 1 and 2]
The adjustment of the macroeconomic variables under the non-cooperative and the cooperative 21 regimes are reported in …gures 1 and 2, respectively. In both regimes, the ECB is inactive, the …scal policies in the low-price (highoutput) countries 1 and 3 are restrictive, whereas the high-price (low-output) country 2 chooses a …scal expansion policy. However, when policy-makers cooperate in order to internalize the externalities, the governments of the lowprice countries pursue less restrictive …scal policies, whereas country 2's …scal authority pursues a less expansionary …scal policy than that pursued in the noncooperative case. The e¤ects of the cooperation are higher volatilities (spreads) of output and in ‡ation in all countries. Therefore, the reason of the lower losses associated with cooperative regimes has to be found in the more moderate use of the …scal instruments. Table 2 describes the results of our second numerical simulation where we investigate the power distribution among EMU policy-makers. We consider the same situation depicted in the previous numerical simulation (model symmetry), but now we assume that country 3 has always a lower bargaining power when it cooperates with the (an) other policy-maker(s) (power asymmetry). 22 More in 20 The robustness of this result was veri…ed with respect to a broad set of model parameters. 21 Since in this scenario the full …scal and the grand coalitions coincide, we speak of cooperative regime to indicate both of them. 22 The bargaining power of a country can be assumed to be an increasing function of its relative size (e.g. the share of its GDP with respect to the aggregate GDP of the EMU). detail, country 3 (the small country) is assumed to have a bargaining power equal to 1 5 in the grand coalition regime (while the other players share the rest, i.e. each of them has a bargaining power equal to (
Scenario II -Large vs. small countries (power asymmetry)
3 ), the small country's bargaining power is assumed to be equal to 1 4 in the full …scal regime (others 3 8 ), and it is assumed to be equal to 1 3 when the small country cooperates with one of the other countries ( 2 3 ). Of course, the (optimal) losses associated with the non-cooperative regime and the coalition between the large country 1 and the large and high-price country 2 are the same as in table 1. In this scenario, all the countries are asymmetric through the combination of the power and the shock asymmetries.
As in the previous scenario the coalition between countries 1 and 3 is not pro…table. But, di¤erently from table 1, the coalition between the large highprice country and the small low-price country (2-3) is not pro…table. In fact, due to the di¤erent bargaining power distribution, the coalition among the highprice and the small countries does not show the symmetric (optimal) losses of that between the large countries (compare the optimal losses of …scal coalitions (1-2) and (2-3) in tables 1 and 2).
[around here table 2]
The coalition between the two large countries (1-2) is internally stable but externally unstable since there is an incentive for the small country to join the coalition. If the ECB is not allowed to participate to a coalition, the …scal regime C is both internally and externally stable, and therefore, it is the CNE of the game since it is also pro…table. But if the ECB can join the full …scal coalition, the full …scal coalition is not externally stable any longer. The equilibrium, in this case, turns out to the non-cooperative equilibrium since if the low-price large country (country 1) leaves the grand coalition, it achieves a lower (optimal) loss (recall that if country 1 leaves the coalition, the ECB is also assumed to leave it).
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The asymmetric distribution of the bargaining power yields two e¤ects: it reduces the willingness to cooperate of the low bargaining power country and it redistributes the (optimal) losses among the coalition members in the di¤erent policy regimes. The …rst e¤ect tends to increase the instability of the coalitions while the second tends to reduce their pro…tability.
In order to understand the complexity of the policy-makers' interactions, note that if coalition members can block the entry of other policy-makers (exclusive membership assumption), the coalition (1-2) between the two large countries also becomes an equilibrium of the game since the (large) high-price country 2 can prevent that the small country 3 enters this coalition. Similarly, the full …scal coalition becomes an equilibrium since the …scal authorities can prevent that the ECB enters the coalition. Considering the unanimity assumption (i.e. all pro…table coalitions are an equilibrium), the number of equilibria increases since three policy regimes are pro…table, i.e. the grand coalition B, the full …scal coalition C , and the partial …scal coalition (1-2). The e¤ects of farsightedness are also notable. In our example, consideration about farsightedness does not enforce the full cooperation, as usual. In fact, in our case, when policy-makers deviate from pro…table but unstable coalitions, they always join a stable and pro…table coalition structure.
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[around here …gure 3]
The adjustment of the macroeconomic variables under the non-cooperative and the full …scal cooperative regimes can be compared by looking at …gures 1 and 4. In both regimes, the …scal policies in low-price (high-output) countries 1 and 3 are restrictive, and the …scal policy in the high-price country 2 is expansionary. When the full …scal cooperation is considered all …scal policies are smoothed (i.e. restrictive policies become less restrictive and expansionary policies become less expansionary), but the ECB is no longer inactive, 25 as in the non-cooperative case, since, the …scal policies of countries 1 and 3 do not exactly compensate that of country 2 because of the power asymmetry. The e¤ects of cooperation on macroeconomic variables is similar to that exposed in …gure 2, where the equal bargaining power case is depicted. However, since asymmetric bargaining powers are assumed asymmetric di¤erences in the (optimal) individual losses of the national …scal authorities are due to the ECB intervention.
Scenario III -Di¤erent openness and competitiveness (model asymmetry)
In the third scenario, we remove the assumption of model symmetry. We consider the following changes in the structural (form) parameters presented in our …rst two scenarios. Countries 2 and 3 are assumed to be subject to a high structural form output elasticity of competitiveness vis-à-vis country 1 (' 21 = ' 31 = 0@4; other '( are assumed to remain the same at a value of 0@2). Changes in country 1's income are assumed to have a strong impact on the other countries () 21 = ) 31 = 0@5) but income changes in countries 2 and 3 are assumed to have marginal e¤ects on country 1 () 12 = ) 13 = 0@1). Changes in the income of countries 2 and 3 are assumed to have a moderate e¤ect on the income of the other country () 23 = ) 32 = 0@3). These parameters imply that countries 2 and 3 are (relatively) more open and are more exposed to international competitiveness within EMU than country 1. The above parameterization implies several structural externalities because of the changes in the output elasticities of openness and competitiveness. An equal bargaining power (power symmetry) 24 However, further simulations, not reported here, show that increasing the bargaining power asymmetry, the incentive to deviate rises and, in this case, if pro…tability is still satis…ed, farsightedness reinforces the (full) …scal regime and the grand coalition solutions. See also van Aarle et al. (2001a) for the two-country case. 25 Monetary policy becomes tightening.
and the same asymmetric price shock (shock asymmetry) as in the previous two numerical simulations are assumed . Therefore, all the countries are asymmetric through the combination of the model and the shock asymmetries. Table 3 describes the results of our …nal numerical simulation.
Despite the fact that several asymmetries are present, no coalitions are profitable. This means that the unique CNE is the non-cooperative regime, which is not the …rst best for any of the policy-makers. The e¤ects of cooperation on the policy-makers' (optimal) losses are rather complex. All the cooperative regimes are pro…table for the high-price country 2, but all the coalitions including country 2 imply higher (optimal) losses for the other participant(s). The sole pro…table coalition for the low-price (open) country 3 is the partial coalition with the other low-price country 1. However, the optimal strategy of country 1 is to free-ride since its optimal strategy is always to avoid cooperation with the other policy-makers.
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The adjustment of the macroeconomic variables associated with the noncooperative regime is described in …gure 4. Since the country one's restrictive …scal policy has a large negative e¤ect on the outputs of countries 2 and 3, the ECB follows an expansionary monetary policy. The …gure 4 clearly illustrates that model asymmetries imply a very di¤erent (optimal) behavior of the policymakers.
[around here …gure 4] Taking into account the other endogenous coalition formation games, the lack of pro…tability implies that a solution being di¤erent from the non-cooperative one will never emerge. Therefore, under this parameterization, the non-cooperative result is quite robust with respect to di¤erent speci…cations of the coalition formation process (e.g. exclusive membership, sequential entry or farsightedness).
The ultimate non-cooperative result seems to show that the existence of asymmetries is a necessary condition to observe gains in the cooperation but it is not a su¢cient condition.
Concluding remarks
This paper focuses on how coalitions among …scal and monetary authorities are formed and what are their e¤ects on the stabilization of output and in ‡ation. In doing that, we introduce a novelty in the literature by combining the following two aspects of policy coordination: (a) macroeconomic stabilization policies of individual countries and a common central bank of a monetary union are considered in a three-country dynamic model, (b) coalition formation among policy-makers to coordinate their policies is explicitly considered by using the recent approach of endogenous coalition formation theory.
More in detail, our paper extends the dynamic two-country EMU model of Engwerda et al. (2002) by using the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. This approach consists in reducing a game in normal form to a two-stage game. In the …rst stage policy-makers try to form coalitions among them by playing non-cooperatively according to different possible initial assumptions (to which correspond di¤erent equilibrium concepts). Afterwards, in the second stage of the game, the coalitions formed (or the individual policy-makers) play non-cooperatively in setting their stabilization policies to face an asymmetric shock in a dynamic environment.
Coordination of (national) …scal policies and (a common) monetary policy was then investigated through several numerical simulations where we have concentrated our attention on the role played by asymmetries (in structural and preference parameters) and externalities, which are the key to endogenously explain the coalition formation.
We have considered three scenarios for numerical simulations: i) a monetary union composed by three symmetric countries, that face an asymmetric shock, ii) a monetary union where a small country interacts with two large countries, that face an asymmetric shock, and iii) a monetary union composed of two (relatively) open countries that face an asymmetric shock, and interact with a (relatively) closed country. From our numerical simulations …ve major conclusions can be derived.
1. Regimes di¤erent from the grand coalition, the full …scal coalition, and the non-cooperative regime are never an equilibrium of the game. In fact, the full …scal coalition is always the equilibrium in the …rst scenario and it is also so in the second scenario according to some equilibrium concepts only, whereas the grand coalition is an equilibrium only in the …rst case (where it coincides with the full …scal coalition because of the symmetries). In the third scenario, the non-cooperative regime is the equilibrium of the game for all equilibrium concepts considered.
2. As for the static two-country models, …scal coordination seems to be counter-productive unless asymmetries are present. In fact, in the …rst scenario countries want to cooperate only if they are subject to asymmetric shocks. However, considering three countries, two symmetric countries can bene…t from cooperation if they coordinate their …scal instrument with that of a third asymmetric country.
3. In our benchmark case (the …rst scenario) cooperation always implies the lowest losses for all …scal authorities without a¤ecting the optimal cost of the ECB. Therefore, it turns out to be the equilibrium of the game irrespective of the equilibrium concept that is used to solve the game.
4. Under asymmetric bargaining powers (scenario two) the full …scal coalition di¤ers from the grand coalition and the equilibrium of the game depends on the assumptions considered. However, the grand coalition is never an equilibrium of the game, whereas the full …scal coalition is an equilibrium (but not unique) under the unanimity and exclusive membership assumptions.
5. In the third scenario, the less open and less exposed to intra-EMU competition country always wants to free-ride and does not want to cooperate with the more open and exposed counties. Furthermore, the more open and exposed counties do not want to cooperate with each other. Hence, this scenario, where many asymmetric externalities are present, illustrates that the existence of asymmetries and externalities is a necessary but not su¢cient condition for cooperation since the unique equilibrium is the non-cooperative solution.
We think that this latter observation deserves further attention, so that we would like to investigate the impact of the sign and the size of spillovers on coordination in the near future. In addition, we would like to explicitly consider di¤erent equilibrium concepts and study how they are related to the institutional setting of the EMU.
Appendix
Reduced form of the model De…ning the following matrices:
where E " := 1 ¡ % " + " for , 2 f1-2-3g and
we can rewrite the reduced form equations for real outputs as:
The coe¢cients of the dynamic law of motion of the system _ ((") = 1((") + P 3 "=1 2 " $ " (") + 2 ! , ! (") are then given by the following expression: 
| 5 7 5 :(").
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The basic algorithm to derive the game solutions
The algorithm is described by the following 5 steps.
1. Factorize matrices ; " as
; and the other coe¢cients are scalars.
Compute the following matrices:
4. After computing the eigenstructure of ; , take three positive eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors S " (for , 2 f1-2-3g) to write the following expression:
from which we can derive the optimal controls: 0
where BH " := U " T ¡1 .
5. Rewrite the cost functions of the policy-makers and the dynamics of the
1 ./ (, respectively. The problem is then solved by considering:
where T " solves the following Lyapunov equation:
Cooperative solutions are achieved by using the same algorithm and factorizing ; " matrix in a similar way as in van Aarle et al. (2001b) . 
